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Thursday, April 24, 2025

Section 7872 Defeats IRS Claim of Gift Involving Family Loan

 

In a recent U.S. Tax Court case, Estate of Barbara Galli, Deceased, Stephen R. Galli, Executor, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the court addressed a tax dispute involving a $2.3 million purported loan transfer between Barbara Galli and her son, Stephen, in 2013. The case, decided via summary judgment, centered on whether this transfer was a loan, a gift, or a partial gift. Since the IRS did not assert that the entire transaction was not a loan but instead was a part loan/part gift, the court found no gift at all because the loan documents provided for adequate interest under Section 7872.

FACTS: Barbara Galli, who passed away in Florida in 2016, transferred $2.3 million to her son, Stephen, in 2013. The transfer was documented as a loan with a 9-year term and an interest rate of 1.01%, matching the mid-term Applicable Federal Rate (AFR) at the time. The loan was unsecured, lacked standard commercial enforcement provisions, and required annual interest payments with the principal due at the end of the term. Stephen made interest payments in 2014, 2015, and 2016, and the unpaid loan was included in Barbara’s estate tax return, valued at $1.624 million. The premise of the IRS’ claim was that there was a question about whether Stephen had the financial wherewithal to repay the loan, and thus the principal amount should be discounted by appraisal taking into the ability to repay. The excess of the principal amount over the discounted value was asserted to be a taxable gift. Bolstering its argument, the IRS sought to apply the consistency doctrine, since Barbara’s estate reported a lower than face value amount as to the value of the note for estate tax purposes, taking into account similar considerations that warranted a reduced value for the note. The taxpayer moved for summary judgment on the gift issue citing Frazee v. Commissioner (1992), which held that §7872 provides comprehensive treatment for loans at or above the AFR for both income and gift tax purposes, displacing traditional fair market valuation methods for gift tax purposes. The court agreed, also acknowledging that the consistency doctrine did not apply due to the different rules that applied under §7872 versus estate tax valuation.

COMMENTS: There are several takeaways from this case. The first is that the court accepted the premise of the taxpayer’s argument that traditional valuation principles that value a promissory note for estate tax purposes, which include judgments relating to the likelihood of repayment, do not apply in determining whether a loan transaction constitutes a partial gift if there is loan and it is not considered a below-market loan under §7872. Secondly, if the IRS could have shown that there was no valid loan element at all, then §7872 would not apply and presumably the entire transfer would have been a taxable gift. Therefore, if factually there are substantial questions about whether loan treatment at all is proper, a gift can result. In this case, even though the note was unsecured, that the interest was timely paid was probably a useful fact in this regard. The decision can provide some comfort to taxpayers that there appears to be an all or nothing approach to the IRS being able to obtain gift treatment if there is adequate interest under §7872  but there may be some question as to ability to repay– assuming adequate interest either the transaction is entirely free of gift tax as a loan, or fully a gift if it can be shown that there was no bona fide loan at all. This case can be compared to Estate of Bolles v. Comm’r, 133 AFTR 2d 2024-1235 (9th Cir 2024), affirming TC Memo 2020-71, in which loans were entirely reclassified as gifts where there were no repayments and there was evidence of lack of ability of the borrower to repay the loans.

CITES: Estate of Barbara Galli v Comm’r, Docket Nos. 7003-20 and 7005-20 (March 5, 2025); Frazee v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 554 (1992); Estate of Bolles v. Comm’r, 133 AFTR 2d 2024-1235 (9th Cir 2024), affirming TC Memo 2020-71; Code § 7872.